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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HARRY WALTERS and BETTY 
WALTERS, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
ROBERT W. BRANDT, Adminis-
trator of the Estate of Barbara 
Best Pelly, appointed in Utah, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPE:LLANT 
Case No. 
9880 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND O·F CASE 
Appellant appeals to the Supreme Court of Utah 
from a jury verdict entered in the District Court 
of Sevier County and the denial of Defendant's 
Motion for a New Trial. Plaintiffs were awarded 
damages for personal injuries and property dam-
ages resulting from an automobile accident that 
involved a pickup truck driven by plaintiff Harry 
Walters, and an automobile driven by Barbara Best 
Pelly, who was killed in the accident. 
DISPOSIT]jON IN THE LOWE~R COURT 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
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plaintiffs. Defendant filed a timely motion for new 
trial which was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPE.AL 
The appellant seeks to have the Judgment on 
the Verdict vacated and the case remanded for a 
new trial. 
STATEMENT O·F FACTS 
August 22, 1953, at about 5:15 p.m., Harry 
Walters, accompanied by Betty Walters, his wife, 
was driving south on Highway 89, approximately 
V2 .mile south of Aurora, Utah. Mrs. Barbara Best 
Pelly, accompanied by her daughter, was driving 
north on Highway 89. The pickup truck driven by 
Harry Walters collided broadside with the Chev-
rolet automobile driven by Barbara Best Pelly. Mr. 
and Mrs. Walters were injured and Mrs. Pelly and 
her daughter were killed. 
There ·is a conflict of evidence as to the path 
of the Walters' car just prior to the accident. The 
evidence is undisputed that the Pelly vehicle pulled 
slightly off to the right side of the road, approxi-
mately 55 feet south of the point of impact betwe·en 
the vehicles (R. 194), then turned left across a 
bridge to the west side of the road, and at a point 
approximately 4 feet west of the center of the high-
way (R. 260), while angled toward the northwest, 
the Pelly vehicle was struck in the middle of the 
right side by the front of the Walters' pickup truck. 
(R. 292-293) 
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Mr. W·alters and his wife testified that they 
had passed another southbound vehicle, some dis-
tance north of the scene of the accident, and had 
travelled on the west side of the road for most of 
the distance from Aurora. (R. 182-R. 102) 
Alden Roberts, an eyewitness to the accident, 
testified that the Walters vehicle was attempting 
to pass two southbound automobiles, and had trav-
elled on the left, or the east side of the road for 
approximately 3 to 4 blocks. (R. 295-297) Roberts 
saw the Pelly car approaching from the south on 
its own side of the highway, and .at the time Mrs. 
Pelly approached the bridge, near the accident ~cene, 
the Walters car was on the wrong side of the road. 
(R. 291, R. 302) The Pelly automobile turned sharply 
to the West, across the bridge; and simultaneously 
the Walters vehicle was suddenly turned to the west 
side of the road. (R. 293) The Walters vehicle col-
ljded with the right side of the Pelly automobile. 
(R. 208) 
There was evidence at the trial by the witness 
Robert Averett, that he had followed the Pelly au-
tomobile for about a mile, keeping right behind it, 
and that he, Averett, was not travelling in excess 
of 50 miles per hour. (R. 196) The speed limit was 
posted as 60 miles per hour. Averett testified that 
at the moment of the impact, the Walters pickup 
truck was facing southwest and was turning from 
the east to the west side of the road, and was par-
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tially on its wrong side, or the east side of the road, 
at impact. (R. 204, Exhibit 3) Tire marks on fhe 
east side of the road leading directly to the left 
wheels of the pickup truck were 40 feet in length. 
(R. 203, R. 204) 
Just before reaching the bridge near the acci-
dent scene, the right wheels of the Pelly car were 
off the hard surface portion of the road. The inves-
tigating police officer identified tire mark~ from the 
east shoulder, south of the bridge, where the marks 
then turned to the west, across the bridge to the 
point of impact, the entire marks being 57 feet" in 
length to the west edge of the highway, which was 
approximately 5 feet west of the impact. (R .. 228, 
R. 232) 
Photographs of the Pelly automobile and the 
Walters truck show the impact on the vehicles, 
clearly indicating that the Walters pickup truck hit 
the P.elly automobile broadside, in the middle of 
the right side, with no damage to the rear fender 
or front fender of the. Pelly automobile; ·(Exhibits 
5 ·and 6) 
The action was tried to a jury and a verdict 
wasreturned in favor of the plaintiffs. 
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STATEMENT OF P!OINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING INSTRUC-
TION 17 TO THE JURY, SAID INSTRUCTION BEING 
A VERDICT DIRECTING (FORMULA) INSTRUCTION 
WHICH DID NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE DE-
FENHANT'S THEORY OF THE CASE. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 13, RELATING TO 
THE STATUTORY DUTY OF A DRIVER OPERATING 
A VEHICLE TO THE LEFT OF THE CENTER OF THE 
HIGHWAY IN OVERTAKING AND PASSING ANOTHER 
VEHICLE TRAVELLING IN THE SAME DIRECTION. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO 
THE JURY THE QUESTION OF DEFENDANT'S SPEED, 
AS NEGLIGENCE. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT 
TO THE JURY DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED.INSTRUC-
TION NO. 7, WHICH INSTRUCTION ENCOMPASSED 
THE DEFENDANT'S THEORY OF THE CASE THAT 
THE CONDUCT OF THE PLAINTIFF CREATED AN 
EMERGENCY SITUATION, AND WHICH THEORY WAS 
SUPPORTED BY COMPET'ENT, SUBSTANTIAL EVI-
DENCE. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT .ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 
3, WHICH INSTRUCTION SET FORTH THE STATU-
TORY RULE AS TO THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE 
REQUIRED WHEN THE TORT FEASOR IS DEAD. 
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POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING REPETI-
TIOUS INSTRUCTIONS WHICH PREJUDICIALLY EM-
PHASIZED PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF RECOVERY IN 
THE CASE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING INSTRUC-
TION 17 TO THE JURY, SAID INSTRUCTION BEING 
A VERDICT DIRECTING (FORMULA) INSTRUCTION 
WHICH DID NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE DE-
FENDANT'S THEORY OF THE CASE. 
Defendant's theory and defense in this case was 
that the truck driven by Harry Walters was travel-
ling on its left, or wrong side of the road, just prior 
to the collision and an emergency situation was 
created as the Walters vehicle and the Pelly auto-
mobile approached, and that both vehicles, with a 
headon collision imminent, turned to the west side 
of the road almost simultaneously. 
The evidence from the eyewitness Alden Rob-
_erts, who was following the Walters pickup truck, 
was clear and unequivocal that the pickup truck 
was driven on the east half of the road, southbound, 
for three or four blocks, until just a second before 
the accident, (R297) and the Pelly automobile was 
on its right side of the road as it approached the 
bridge, and. at the time the Pelly vehicle was near 
the bridge, Walters was still on the left side of the 
road (R. 291). Mr. Roberts testified that both ve-
hicles suddenly turned to the west side of the road. 
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(R. 292) The physical evidence shows clearly that 
Mrs. Pelly was on the east side of the road, her 
right side, until she was within less than 60 feet 
from the point of impact. (R. 228, R. 232) The eye-
witness Averett testified that the Pelly car was on 
its right side, east side, of the road until it got to 
the bridge, then it turned up sharply to the west 
side of the road. (R. 194) Averett further testified 
as to the position of the Walters car at impact, 
being angled across the center of the road, partially 
on the wrong side (R. 204 and Exhibit 3}, and he 
observed tire marks on the east side of the road 
leading directly to the pickup truck as it was stop-
ped after the accident. (R. 199-R. 203) 
Instruction No. 17 given by the court was as 
follows: 
"In order for you to find a verdict in 
favor of the Plaintiffs and against the De-
fendant, the Plaintiffs have the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
one or more of the following facts: 
A. That the Defendant was driving her 
automobile at a speed in excess of 60 miles 
per hour. 
B. In crossing the center line of the 
highway into the opposing lane of traffic 
when it was not safe so to do. . 
C. In failing to keep said automobile 
under proper control. 
D. In failing to keep a proper lookout 
and in failing to see the automobile driven 
by the Plaintiff. 
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E. In running head on into the auto-
mobile of the Plain tiff. 
"The plaintiffs have the burden of prov-
ing by a preponderance of the evidence that 
one or more of the acts or o1nissions desig-
nated as A, B, C, D, & E was the efficient and 
moving cause which in a natural and contin-
uous sequence, unbroken by any new, inde-
pendent cause, produced the collision which 
resulted in the injuries and damage alleged 
and claimed by the Plaintiff. 
"The Plaintiffs ha:v·e the burden of prov-
ing by a preponderance of the evidence what 
damage, if any, they suffered; if you find the 
Defendant negligent in any one or more of 
the items set out in A, B, C, D, and E, and 
if you find that one or more of such acts or 
omissions were the proximate cause of the 
injuries to Plaintiffs, then you must find for 
the Plaintiffs in such amounts as your judg-
ment dictates and directs. Such an award for 
Plaintiff Harry Walters, must not exceed the 
sum of 5,000.00 general damages and $100.00 
special damages, while damages awarded the 
Plaintiff. Betty Walters, must not exceed 
$50,000.00 general damages and $160.50 spe-
cial damages. In specifying this limit of dam-
ages, you are not to construe it as an inti-
mation of what your verdict as to damages 
should be. In determining the amount of such 
damages, you may consider, so far as is shown 
by ·evidence, the nature, character and extent 
of injuries suffered. by Mr. Walters and Mrs. 
Walters, whether such injuries are temporary 
or permanent; and you may also take into 
consideration the pain and suffering, past 
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and future, so far as shown by the evidence, 
and to award such damages as will reasonably 
and justly compensate for the injuries sus-
tained, not exceeding the sum of $5,100.00 in 
the case of Harry Walters, the amount he 
has prayed for in his complaint, and the sum 
of $50,160.50 in the case of Betty Walters, th~ 
amount she has claimed in her Complaint." 
In· this instruction the court set forth each and 
every allegation ·of negligence claimed by the plain-
tiffs, had a paragraph on preponderance of the evi-
dnece and in the third paragraph of the instruction 
charged the jury: 
"The Plaintiffs have the burden of prov-
ing by a preponderance of the evidence what 
damage, if any, they suff.ered; if you find the 
Defendant negligent in any one or more of 
the items set out in A, B, C, D, and E, and 
if you find that one or more of such acts or 
omissions were the proximate cause of the 
injuries to Plaintiffs, then you must find for 
the Plaintiffs in such amount as your judg-
ment dictates and directs. (Emphasis ours) 
This is the so-called formula instruction and 
by telling the jury they must return a verdict for 
plaintiff if they found the defendant committed cer-
tain acts or omissions the court has ignored com-
pletely the defendant's theory and defense. 
Instruction 17 is further erroneous in that the 
court in the first paragraph of the instruction, in-
structed the jury, that in order to find for the 
plaintiffs and against the defendants, the plaintiffs 
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had the burden of proving one or more of the facts 
set forth as a, b, c, d, or e. 
There was no dispute in the case that the Pelly 
automobile was to the left side of the center of the 
highway at the time of collision. The defendant's 
theory of the case was that the Pelly vehicle turned 
to the left side of the road almost simultaneously 
with the turning to the west side of the road, back 
to his proper side, by Mr. Walters. Defendant's 
defense was based upon the factual situation that 
the two cars approaching headon, on the East side 
of the road, resulted in an emergency situation 
whereby Mrs. Pelly had to make an instantaneous 
decision, continue ahead, or try to turn off the road, 
to the west, to get out of the way of the Walters 
pickup truck. Because of the bridge on the east 
side of the road she was in the position of going 
straight ahead, directly into the approaching pickup 
truck, or turning to the left to attempt to get off 
the road. 
The factual situation in this case is almost on 
all fours with the factual situation presented in 
Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 Pacific 2nd 
772. In that case the deceased (Plaintiff )was driv-
ing on his left side of the road and the defendant 
was driving on his right side of the road. When 
the cars were approximately 225 feet apart, the 
defendant turned to the left side of the road and 
the plaintiff at that time turned right, to his proper 
10 
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side of the road, and a collision occurred on the 
defendant's wrong :side of the road. As in our case, 
the facts in Morrison v. Perry, involved a collision 
whereby the plaintiff and defendant collided on the 
plaintiff's proper side of the road, but the evidenc-e 
in the case having been produced to show that 
plaintiff had originally been on his wrong side of 
road, 225 feet before impact, and with the impend-
in gemergency defendant turned left to avoid a 
headon collision, just as plaintiff turned right, to 
his proper side of the road. 
The factual situation in the Morrison vs. Perry 
case, and the instructions given in that case, are 
very close in fact with the case now before this 
court. The legal principles set forth in the Morrison 
vs. Perry decision are squarely applicable to the 
situation in this case and indicate without question 
the error in the court's instruction number 17. 
In the Morrison vs. Perry case the court, Utah 
Supreme Court, in granting a new trial, and in 
holding that the trial court committed error in the 
instructions, said: 
"In instruction No. 2, the court pro-
pounds the following: 
1. Did the defendant, at the time of or 
immediately preceding this accident, drive 
his automobile at a high, angerous and un-
lawful rate of speed or at a rate of speed 
faster than was reasonable and prudent, hav-
ing due regard to the surfac-e and width of 
the highway and traffic thereon? 
11 
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2. Did the defendant, at the time of or 
immediately preceding this accident, drive 
his car without having it under immediate 
control, so that he could not stop it within 
the range of his vision? 
3. Did the defendant at the time of or 
immediately preceding this accident, fail to 
keep a careful lookout ahead for other cars 
on the highway? 
4. Did the defendant, at the time of or 
immediately preceding this accident, while 
driving his car upon the highway, suddenly 
and without warning swerve his car sharply 
to the left directly in the path of and against 
the truck driven by Mr. Spiers? 
5. Did the defendant, at the time of or 
immediately preceding this accident, drive 
his car on the wrong, or lefthand, side of the 
highway? 
"Following this the instruction goes on: 
'If you answer all of these questions 
in the negative then you should bring a 
verdict in favor of the defendant. But 
if you answer any or all of these ques-
tions in the affirmative then you must 
determine the following question: Was 
the defendant, in so driving his automo-
bile, guilty of negligence?' 
The following questions were then asked 
with respect to the alleged grounds of con-
tributory negligence: 
1. Did the deceased, John K. Spiers, at 
the time of or immediately preceding this ac-
cident, drive his truck on the wrong side of 
the highway? 
12 
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2. Did the deceased, at the time of or 
immediately preceding this accident, drive his 
truck at a rate of speed faster than was 
reasonable and prudent having due regard 
to the surface and with of the highway and 
conditions then existing and the traffic 
thereon? 
3. Did the deceased, at the time of or 
immediately preceding this accident, fail to 
have his truck under immediate control? 
4. Did the deceased, at the time of or 
immediately preceding this accident, while 
driving on the wrong side of the highway, 
suddenly and without warning turn his auto-
mobile into and against the car driven by the 
defendant? 
"The court then states: 
'If your answer to any of these ques-
tions is in the affirmative, then you must 
determine the following: Was the de-
ceased, in so driving his truck, guilty of 
negligence?' 
"In other instructions the court stated in 
substance that a person who drove an auto-
mobile in the manner described in the pro-
pounded questions was negligent, and in In-
struction No. 13, instructed with respect to 
an emergency allegedly created by the de-
ceased. The jury was told that if a person 
drove his car in a certain manner he was neg-
ligent, and also that if he drove his car in 
that manner they were then to determine 
whether or not he was negligent. Thus the 
jury was permitted to decide that acts of neg-
ligence as a matter of law were not negligent. 
13 
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These instructions were conflicting and the 
giving of such instructions constitutes error. 
Sorenson v. Bell, 51 Utah 262, 170 P. 172. 
"The court in question number 5 of In-
struction No. 2, concerning defendant's neg-
ligence failed to take into consideration de-
fendant's theory of the case. Defendant 
alleged and offered evidence to prove that 
deceased created an emergency by operating 
his truck on the wrong side of the road. The 
form of the instruction was such as to defi-
nitely suggest that driving on the left-hand 
side of the highway by defendant was in fact 
negligence, and it was not pointed out that 
his so doing, would not constitute negligence 
if deceased created a hazard and that plaintiff 
could not take advantage of deceased's wrong 
predicate liability on defendant's acts in fail-
ing to exercise perfect judgment to avoid an 
e.mergency. 
"Defendant's theory, which was support-
·ed by evidence, was that deceased, by driving 
on his left-hand side of the highway, and his 
failure to turn to his right side in time to 
avoid creating an emergency, did create an 
emergency w h i c h confronted defendant 
through no fault of his. The court failed to 
properly separate the theories of the parties, 
but instead gave general instructions treating 
the rights and duties of each driver as being 
mutual without regard to defendant's theory 
as to deceased's negligence in first oeing on 
his wrong side of the highway. Defendant is 
entitled to have his case submitted to the jury 
on any theory justified by proper evidence. 
Morgan v. Bingham Stag.e Line Co., 75 Utah 
87, 283 P. 160; Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 
14 
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Utah 121, 124 P. 522; Pratt v. Utah Light & 
Traction Co., 57 Utah 7, 169 P. 868; Smith v. 
Lenzi, 7 4 Utah 362, 279 P. 893; Martineau v. 
H·anson, 4 7 Utah 549, P. 432. 
"Each party is entitled to have his theory 
of the case presented in such a way as to aid 
the jury and not confus-e it. In Throne v. J. P. 
O'Neill Construction Company, 40 Utah 265, 
121 P. 10, 16, the court suggests the better 
.practice of presenting the parties' theories of 
the case to thejury: 
"'One way the court might have fol-
lowed in charging the jury would have 
been to charge them in separate instruc-
tio:ns, first, in accordance with respond-
ent's evidence; and, second, in accordance 
with appellant's evidence which related 
to the proposition covered by the instruc-
tion in question, and in each instruction 
have directed the jury to return a verdict 
in accordance with their findings upon 
that question.' " 
Giving of a formula instruction was held re-
versible error in Ivie v. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5, 11, 
336 P. 2d 781, for the following reasons: 
"The court gave this Instruction No. 4: 
"If you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant failed to ke·ep 
and maintain a proper lookout for the plain-
tiff in the driveway where the accident oc-
curred and that such failure promixately 
resulted in the accident, then your verdict 
must be in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendant.' 
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"The above instruction, taken by itself, 
is in error because it fails to take into account 
the possible contributory negligence of the 
plaintiff. This kind of instruction, sometimes 
referred to as a 'formula' instruction, which 
makes a recital in accordance with the con-
tention of a party and ·ends with a conclusion: 
'* * * and if you so find, then your verdict 
must be for (the party)' is not generally a 
good type of instruction to give. This is so 
because it lends itself to the error just noted 
and also be·caus·e it tends to be argumentative 
rather than to set out the principles of law 
applicable to the issues impartially as to both 
parties. For such reasons it is better to avoid 
giving instructions of that type. It is con· 
ceded that the issue of contributory negli-
gence was properly covered in the next in-
struction. This, how·ever, pitted one instruc-
tion against the other and might have been 
confusing to the jury.' " 
The Missouri court in Rearick vs. Manzella, 
355 S.W. 2d 134, 136 (Mo.), used similar language 
in reversing a jury award which was based upon a 
formula instruction: 
"It is here contended by defendant that 
the trial court erred in giving plaintiff's ver-
dict-directing Instruction No. 1 because it 
failed to refer to or negative plaintiff's con-
tributiory negligence submitted as a defense 
in defendant's Instruction No. 7, 'thereby 
creating a conflict between the two instruc-
tions.' In view of present controlling deci-
sions it is our manifest duty to sustain the 
contention." 
16 
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A. later instruction directing the jury to consider 
all instructions together was held insufficient to 
correct the error. 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico similarly 
observed in McFatridge vs. Harlem Globe Trotters, 
365 p .. 2d 918: 
"There are innumerable cases holding 
that a 'for.mula' instruction must include each 
and every element requisite to support aver-
dict, and that omission of any of these ele-
ments can not be supplied by reference to 
other instructions correctly stating the law." 
See also Whaley vs. Crutchfield, 294 S.W. 
2d 775 (Ark.). 
In Bey.erle v. Clift (Calif.), 209 Pac. 1015, the 
California court reversed a judgment because a for-
.mula instruction did not include all conditions of 
recovery. 
"The errors relied upon consist in the 
giving of two instructions to the jury. In 
each of these instructions, the court stated 
certain provisions of law defining the duties 
imposed upon an operator of a vehicle, and 
then said: 
" 'If, therefore, you believe that the de-
fendant violated any of the provisions of the 
law above mentioned at the time of the acci-
dent complained of in this case, and that such 
violation was the proximate cause of the 
accident, you should find for the plaintif.' 
"Assuming that the issue of contributory 
negligence was properly before the court, 
there is no doubt that these w·ere erroneous 
17 
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instructions, because it is settled law that, if 
an instruction by its terms purports to state 
the conditions necessary to a verdict, it must 
state all those conditions and must not over-
look pleaded defenses on which substantial 
evidence has been introduced. 
"The court gave other instructions on the 
subject of contributory negligence, the cor-
rectness of which is not challenged. But this 
is not sufficient to overcome the prejudicial 
character of the erroneous instructions. 
"'* * * But the giving of these other in-
structions simply produced a clear conflict in 
the instructions given the jury by the court, 
and it is impossible for us to say which in-
struction the jury followed in arriving at a 
verdict in favor of plaintiff.' Pierce v. United 
Gas & Elc. Co., supra, 161 Cal. at page 185, 
118 Pac. at page 704." 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that error 
arising fro.m conflicting instructions is prejudicial 
and is not cured by other correct instructions, be-
cause there i:s no doubt whether the jury followed 
the. proper instruction or the improper one. Soren-
sen v. Bell, 51 U tab 262, 170 P. 72. 
Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines, 75 Utah 87, 
283 Pac. 160, was reversed for a new trial for a new 
trial for failure to instruct the jury in defendant's 
theory of contributory negligence. 
"A party is entitled to have his case sub-
mitted to the jury on the theory of his evi-
dence as well as upon the theory of the whole 
evidence. Toone v. O'Neill Cbnst. Co., 40 Utah 
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265, 121 P. 10, Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 
Utah 121, 124 P. 522, 523, and Miller v. Utah 
Consol. M. Co., et al, ·53 U tab 366, 178 P. 771; 
Pratt v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 57 Utah 
7, 169 P. 868. 
"The following language of Mr. Justice 
Straup in the case of Hartley v. Salt Lake 
City, supra, is particularly applicable here: 
" 'There are two parties to a lawsuit. 
Each on a submission of the case to the jury 
is entitled to a submission of it on his theory 
and the law in respect thereof. The defend-
ant's theory as to the cause of the accident 
is embodied in the proposed requests. There 
is some evidence, as we have shown, to render 
them applicable to the case. That is not dis-
puted. We think the court's refusal to charge 
substantially as requested was error. That 
the ruling was prejudicial and works a re-
versal of the judgment is self-evident and 
unavoidable.' " 
The failure of the court to properly instruct the 
jury on the question of contributory negligence or 
defendant's theory of emergency caused by plain-
tiffs in connection with Instruction No. 17 had the 
effect of failing to submit the case to the jury on 
defendant's theory of the case. 
An instruction which does not contain all of the 
elements dealing with the particular proposition 
under instruction, or is susceptible to more than on~ 
conclusion, constitutes reversible error. Even 
though following instructions may properly define 
the issue in question, such does not remedy the de. 
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feet. The error results from pitting one instruction 
against another, which may confuse the jury. 
In the instant case Instruction 17 was not only 
confusing but was in conflict with other instructions. 
Were the jury to follow one, it must of necessity ig-
nore another. The offending instruction in the in-
stant case violates the clear statement of Morrison v. 
Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P. 2d 772, because the in-
struction as given, did not "aid the jury" but could 
only mislead and confuse it." 
In the case of Jensen v. Utah Railway Com-
pany, 72 Utah 366, 386, 270 P. 349, the Supreme 
Court condemned the use of "formula" instructions 
which tend to apply more general principles of law 
to a case without relating them to facts. 
"The rule is well settled that in instruct-
ing a jury a mere abstract or general state-
ment as to the law should be avoided, and 
that all instructions should be applicable to 
evidence on either on or the other of the re-
spective theories of the parties. Instructions 
which are not so applicable, though abstractly 
they may be correct, are not helpful to the 
jury, are apt to be misleading and to be im-
properly applied. That a proposition may be 
correct in a sense, and yet inapplicable to the 
evidence or to the issue, is readily perceived." 
The mere fact that another instruction men-
tioned the theory of defendant is insufficient to 
correct that error: 
"It is conceded that the issue of contribu-
tory negligence was properly covered in the 
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next instruction. This, however, pitted one 
instruction against the other and might have 
been confusing to the jury." lvie v. Richard-
son, 9 Utah 2d 5, 336 P. 2d 781. 
Clark v. Los Angeles-Salt Lake Railway Com-
pany, 73 Utah 486, 502, 508, 275 P. 582, declares the 
law with reference to the type of error which must 
be committed before a reversal will be granted. 
"All committed errors, of course, are not 
presumptively prejudicial, but, when the error 
is of such nature or character as calculated 
to do harm, prejudice will be presumed until 
by the record it is affirmatively shown that 
the error was not nor could have been of 
harmful effect. Jensen v. Utah Railway Com-
pany, 72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Obviously, all of the theories of the case cannot 
be :stated in one instruction and instructions which 
explain a particular instruction are proper. In the 
instant case the "natural and obvious meaning" of 
Instruction 17 could only lead to conflict and con-
fusion with Instructions 5, 11, 18 dealing with 
contributory negligence, because they were antag-
onistic to each other. To believe one was to reject 
another. Thus, an irreconcilable conflict was pre-
sented to the jury. 
A formula instruction as given in this case has 
ben condemned by the Utah Supreme Court be·cause 
it tends to pit one instruction against another. To 
have followed one instruction would have been to 
disr.egard the other. 
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While the court informed the jury that each 
instruction set out the theory of the two parties, it 
did nothing to clarify or to reconcile the obvious 
antagonis.m betw·een the instructions. The jury was 
still faced with the proposition of accepting one and 
rejecting the other. 
When an instruction is prejudicially erroneous 
on its face, a new trial is in order because the jury 
is presumed to follow the instructions of the court. 
The Supreme Court in the case of Ryan v. Beaver 
County, 82 Utah 27, 31, 21 P. 2d 858 stated: 
"The jury is bound, on questions of law, 
to yield full obedience to the instructions of 
the Court, and this applies as well to that 
part of the charge defining the issues, as 
made by the pleadings, as to the law declared 
by the court, and made applicable to the evi-
dence as submitted." 
The following language of Mr. Justice Straup 
is taken from the case of Jensen v. Utah Railway 
Company, 72 Utah 366, 400, 270 P. 349, 362: 
"However, where the committed error is 
of such nature or character as calculated to 
do hann, or on its face as having the natural 
tendency to do so, prejudice will be presumed, 
until by the record it is affirmatively shown 
that the error was nor or could not have been 
of harmful effect. Thus, if the appellant 
shows committed error of such nature or 
character, he, in the first instance, has made 
a prima facie showing of prejudice. The bur-
den, or rather the duty of going forward, is 
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then cast on the respondent to show by the 
record that the committed error was not, or 
could not have been, of harmful effect." (Cit-
ing cases) 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 13, RELATING TO 
THE STATUTORY DUTY OF A DRIVER OPERATING 
A VEHICLE TO THE LEFT OF THE CENTER OF THE 
HIGHWAY IN OVERTAKING AND PASSING ANOTHER 
VEHICLE TRAVELLING IN THE SAME DIRECTION. 
Def·endant's Requested Instruction No. 13 (R. 
30) was refused by the court. 
"You are instructed that under the laws 
of Utah that no vehicle shall be driven to the 
left side of the center of a roadway in over-
taking and passing of another vehicle pro-
ceeding in the same direction unless such left 
side is clearly visible and is free from oncom-
ing traffic for sufficient distance ahead to 
permit such overtaking and passing to be 
completely made without interfering with the 
safe operation of any vehicle approaching 
from the opposite direction of any vehicle 
overtaking. In every ·event, the overtaking 
vehicle must return to the right hand side of 
the road before coming within 100 feet of 
any vehicle approaching from the opposite 
direction. If you find from the evidence that 
Harry Walters, in passing another vehicle, 
and driving to the left side of the highway 
in overtaking and passing another vehicle 
proceeding in the same direction and he. did 
not return to his own side of the highway, 
without interfering with the safe operation 
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of the Pelly vehicle approaching from the op-
posite direction, then Harry Walters was 
negligent, and if you find that his negligence 
was the proximate cause of the collision, then 
you must return a verdict in favor of the 
defendant and against the plaintiff. No Cause 
of Action." 
The requested instruction is in conformity with 
the provisions of Title 41-6-57, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, which code section provides: 
"No vehicle shall be driven to the left side 
of the center of the roadway in overtaking 
and passing another vehicle proceeding in the 
same direction unless such left side is clearly 
visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a 
sufficient distance ahead to permit such over-
taking and passing to be completely made 
without interfering with the safe operation 
of any vehicle approaching from the opposite 
direction of any vehicle overtaken. In every 
event the overtaking vehicle must return to 
the right-hand side of the roadway before 
coming within 100 feet of any vehicle ap-
proaching from the opposite direction." 
Exception was duly taken to the court's refusal 
to instruct the jury in accordance with the defend-
ant's theory and the statute quoted. (R. 312) 
There was competent and substantial evidence 
by the independent eyewitness Alden Roberts that 
Harry Walters was attempting to pass oether ve-
hicles travelling in the same direction, and Walters 
was on the left side of the highway for several blocks 
and remained on that side of the highway until the 
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Walters truck and the Pelly car, approaching from 
the south, were very close together. The accident 
occurred as both vehicles suddenly turned to the 
west side of the highway. (R. 290-292-293) 
The refusal of the court to instruct the jury in 
accordance with defendant''S theory as to the negli-
gence of Harry Walters and the cause of the col-
lision was prejudicial error. A party has a right 
to have his theory of the case submitted to the jury 
if the evidence would justify reasonable men in fol-
lowing the theory, and the court has the duty to 
cover the theory of both parties in the instructions. 
Morrison v. P·erry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P. 12d 772; 
Beckstrom v. Williams, 282 P. 2d 309, 3 Utah 2nd 
210; Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P. 2d 834. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO 
THE JURY THE QUESTION OF DEFENDANT'S SPEED, 
AS NEGLIGENCE. 
There is no evidence in the record to indicate 
that the vehicle driven by Barbara Best Pelly was 
driven at an excessive rate of speed or that there 
were any conditions existing that made the stated 
speed limit an unsafe speed for travel. Instruction 
No. 11, (R. 40) charged the jury that it was the 
duty of the defendant to use reasonable care under 
the circumstances to avoid danger to himself and 
others, and to observe due care in respect to: 
"(d) to drive at such speed as was safe, rea-
sonable and prudent under the circum-
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stances, having due regard to the width 
surface and condition of the highway, the 
traffic thereon, the visibility, and any actual 
or potential hazards then existing. 
"The designated speed limits for the place 
in question was 60 miles per hour. This means 
only that such speed should ordinarily be 
regarded as safe, reasonable and prudent in 
the absence of any special hazards or con-
ditions tending to make such speed unsafe. 
But any speed in excess of such designated 
speed limit would constitute sufficient evi-
dence to permit a finding that such speed 
was greater than safe, reasonable and pru-
dent. 
"Failure of the plaintiff or defendant to 
operate his automobile in accordance with the 
foregoing requirements of law would consti-
tute negligence on his part." 
"A. That the defendant was driving her 
automobile at a speed in excess of 60 miles 
per hour. 
"* * * 
"if you find the defendant negligent in any 
one of more of the items set out in A, etc., 
and you find that one or more of such acts 
or omissions were the proximate cause of the 
injuries to plaintiff, then you must find for 
the plaintiffs in such amounts as your judg-
ment dictates and directs. * * *" 
The record is void of any evidence that the 
deceased Barbara Best Pelly was driving in excess 
of 50 miles per hour at or near the scene of the 
accident. The only evidence as to the speed of Mrs. 
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Pelly is the testimony of the witness Robert Aver-
ett, who testified that he had followed behind Mrs. 
Pelly for a mile preceding the accident, and she was 
travelling the same speed as Averett, around 50 
miles per hour, and he was positive it was not over 
50 miles per hour. (R. 196) The court instructed 
the jury that the speed limit was 60 miles per hour. 
(R. 40) 
It is erroneous to submit an issue of negligence 
to the jury for consideration when there is no factual 
evidence to support that claimed act of negligence. 
Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, P. 2d 772. Hunter 
v. Michaelis, 114 Utah 242, 198, P. 2d 245, held that 
it was erroneous for the trial court case to instruct 
the jury concerning the matter of speed as negli-
gence, where the evidence showed that the posted 
speed limit was 25 miles per hour and the only evi-
dence in the case was that the defendant was trav-
elling between 20 to 25 miles per hour. The court 
said, "We think the evidence not such as to justify 
giving an instruction on the speed of defendant's 
car." 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT 
TO THE JURY DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TION NO. 7, WHICH INSTRUCTION ENCOMPASSED 
THE DEFENDANT'S THEORY OF THE CASE THAT 
THE CONDUCT OF THE PLAINTIFF CREATED AN 
EMERGENCY SITUATION, AND WHICH THEORY WAS 
SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT, SUBSTANTIAL EVI· 
DENCE. 
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Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 7 was: 
"If you find from the evidence in this 
case, that Harry Walters was driving on the 
left side of the highway as the car driven by 
Harry Walters and Mrs. Pelly approached 
each other, and if this driving on the left side 
of the highway by Harry Walters resulted 
in an emergency, which caused Mrs. Pelly to 
turn to the left and resulted in the collision, 
that said turning to the left side of the high-
way by Mrs. Pelly would not constitute neg-
ligence on her part, and she would not be 
negligent for turning to the left, if the turn-
ing wa:s a result of the hazard created by 
Harry Walters." 
This instruction requested by defendant was 
amply supported by the evidence of the witnesses 
Averett and Roberts, who testified that defendant's 
vehicle was on its own side of the road until just 
before impact and that the vehicle of plaintiffs ap-
proached on its wrong side of the road and turned 
suddenly to the right or west side of the road just 
as the defendant turned to that side of the road . 
The court in refusing to give Instruction No. 7 
as requested by the plaintiff, or to instruct the jury 
in accordance with the theory set forth in that in-
struction committed prejudicial error. Defendant 
exeepted to the refusal of the court to give the in-
struction. (R. 311). Defendant was entitled to have 
the jury instructed upon defendant's theory of the 
case and the failure to do so was and is prejudicial 
·error, and as stated in Morrison v. P·erry, 104 Utah 
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151, 140 P. 2d 772, and cases cited therein; Beck-
strom v. Williams, 282 P. 2d 309, 3 Utah 2d 210; 
Startin v. M~adsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P. 2d 834. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 
3, WHICH INSTRUCTION SET FORTH THE STATU-
TORY RULE AS TO THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE 
REQUIRED WHEN THE TORT FEASOR IS DEAD. 
Defendant requested the court to give request-
ed Instruction No. 3, which requested instruction is 
identical with the instruction No. 5.1, Jury Instruc~ 
tions for Utah, and is the instruction incorporating 
the provisions of Title 78-11-12, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as amended, Laws of Utah, 1953, Chap-
ter 30, Paragraph 1. The statute provides: 
"Causes of action arising out of physical 
injury to the person or death, caused by the 
wrongful act or negligence of another, shall 
not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer, 
and the injured person or the personal rep-
resentatives or heirs of one meeting death, as 
above stated, shall have a cause of action 
against the personal representatives of the 
wrongdoer; provided, however, that the in-
jured person or the personal representatives 
or heirs of one meeting death shall not re-
cover judgment except upon some competent 
satisfactory evidence other than the testi-
. mony of said injured person." 
Barbara Best Pelly, driver of the car which was 
involved in the collision with the vehicles of plain-
tiffs died as a result of the accident. Prior to 1953 
29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and the adoption of Title 78, Chapter 11, Section 12, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, any cause of action 
for personal injury abated with the death of the 
tort feasor. The legislature, in providing for the 
"no abatement" of a cause of action upon the death 
of a wrongdoer, provided certain restrictions as to 
the evidence necessary for injured parties to recover 
against the personal representative of the alleged 
wrongdoer. The statute, giving, in effect, a cause 
of action to plaintiffs, which they would not have 
had previously, places a restriction upon the plain-
tiff''S cause of action, and the court erred in not 
instructing the jury as to the restrictions and the 
burden of proof required by the statute for plain-
tiffs to recover. The Utah Court in the case of Fretz 
v. Anderson, 5 Utah 2d 290, 300 P. 2d 642, recog-
nized that the plaintiff in a personal injury action, 
where the alleged tort :feasor was dead, had the 
burden of proving the negligence in the manner set 
forth by the statute. 
Defendant wa:s prejudiced by the failure of the 
court to instruct the jury in accordance with the 
provision of Title 78-11-12, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING REPETI· 
TIOUS INSTRUCTIONS WHICH PREJUDICIALLY EM· 
PHASIZED PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF RECOVERY IN 
THE CASE. 
Defendant made timely exception to the court's 
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instructions as a whole as being prejudicial and over 
emphasizing plaintiffs' theory of the case. (R. 318) 
The court in Instruction No. 1 (R. 34) charged 
the jury: 
"Plaintiffs allege that defendant's negli-
gence and unlawful conduct, which proxi-
mately caused the accident and resultant in-
juries, consisted of the following: 
A. In driving at an excessive rate of 
speed, to-wit, in excess of 60 miles per hour. 
B. In crossing over the dividing center 
line of said highway into the opposing lane 
of traffic when it was not safe to do so. 
C. In failing to keep said automobile 
under proper control. 
D. In failing to keep a proper lookout 
in failing to see the automobile driven by 
Plaintiff, Harry Walters. 
E. In running head on into the automo-
bile of Plaintiff, Harry Walters, then and 
there perfectly visible and approaching from 
the opposite direction in its own lane of 
traffic." 
The court in Instruction No. 11 (R. 40) in-
structed the jury again concerning the various 
duties and obligations of the plaintiffs and defend-
ants, as follows: 
"It was the duty of the plaintiff and the 
defendant each to use reasonable care under 
the circumstances in driving his automobile 
to avoid danger to himself and others, and 
to observe and to be aware of the conditions 
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of the highway, the traffic thereon, and to 
observe due care in respect to: 
(a) To use reasonable care to keep a 
proper lookout for other vehicles and other 
conditions reasonably to be anticipated. 
(b) To keep his automobile under rea-
sonably safe and proper control. 
(c To drive his automobile on his own 
right side of the highway. 
(d) To drive at such speed as was safe, 
reasonable, and prudent under the circum-
stances, having due regard to the width, sur-
face, and condition of the highway, the traffic 
thereon, the visibility and any actual or po-
tential hazards then existing. 
"The designated :speed limit for the place 
in question was 60 miles per hour. This means 
only that such speed should ordinarily be 
regarded as safe, reasonable, and prudent in 
the absence of any special hazards or condi-
tions tending to make such speed unsafe. But 
any speed in excess of such designated speed 
limit would constitute sufficient evidence to 
permit a find that 'Such speed was greater 
than safe, reasonable, and prudent. 
"Failure of the plaintiff or the defendant 
to operate his automobile in accordance with 
the foregoing requirements of law would 
constitute negligence on his part." 
The court again instructed the jury regarding 
the claimed negligence on the part of defendant in 
Instruction No. 17 (R. 46) as follows: 
"In order for you to find a verdict in 
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favor of the plaintiffs and against the de-
fendant, the plaintiffs have the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
one or more of the following facts: 
"A. That the defendant was driving her 
automobile at a speed in excess of 60 miles 
per hour. -
"B. In crossing the center line of the 
highway into the opposing lane of traffic 
when it was not safe so to do. 
"C. In failing to keep said automobile 
under proper control. 
"D. In failing to keep a proper lookout 
and in failing to see the automobile driven 
by the plaintiff. 
"E. In running head on into the auto-
mobile of the plaintiff." 
In three separate instructions the court set 
forth the items of claimed negligence on the part 
of the defendant's decedent, Babraba Best Pelly. 
Our Supreme Court has long subscribed to the 
principle of law which prohibits reiteration of legal 
propositions to the jury. This doctrine was stated 
in the case of Shields v. Utah Light & Traction Com-
pany, 99 Utah 307, 105 P. 2d 347, as follows: 
". . . (R) esulting emphasis on applicable 
laws favorable to plaintiff's side as the result 
of the continual reference and repeating of 
certain law propositions resulted in the un-
balancing of the charge, and error." 
The fact that the instructions as given are each 
technically correct does not remedy the error. In 
the case of Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 141; 
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279 P. 2d 1073 (1955), the court, in considering the 
rule, declared: 
"Even assuming that the instructions of 
the Court, taken in their entirety, could be 
considered correct as given, the continual re-
petition of instructions of contributory neg-
ligence . . . unbalanced the instructions in 
favor of the defendants and influenced the 
jury in bringing its verdict of no cause of 
action .... " 
It is respectfully submitted that the cumulative 
effect of the instructions given resulted in an imbal-
ance in favor of plaintiffs, and that defendant was 
materially prejudiced thereby. 
CONCLUSION 
Prejudicial error was committed by the trial 
court, and the court erred in failing to grant de-
fendant and appellant's Motion for New Trial, which 
motion was timely made. The error at trial, giving 
erroneous jury instructions and failing to give jury 
instructions to which defendant was entitled pre-
vented defendant and appellant having a fair trial. 
Justice and law requires that the Judgment Upon 
the Verdict be set aside and the case remanded for 
new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HA,NSON & BALDWIN 
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. 
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
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